Does epoché require abstention from taking action?
I read epoché as an intellectual move. That is we suspend judgment with respect to neither assenting to nor denying any particular philosophical insight or system in order to continue investigating.
It’s not about denying preferences or tastes; it doesn’t get in the way of tending to urges like hunger or using the toilet; there’s nothing preventing someone from taking action when it’s needful or useful; it presents no meaningful obstacles to participating in community.
Is the Pyrrhonist especially idle or inactive?
Not especially… tho I do wonder what standard were using to judge what counts as being idle in the first place.
The development of modes and phrases seems like evidence of the sort of activity one might find a skeptic engaged in.
It is commonly held that Sextus was a medic of the Empiric school and he takes time to address medical practices contrasted against Pyrrhonism in his surviving works. As such there’s some reason to suppose Sextus acts as living proof of what a skeptic might be doing.
Through abiding by what seems to be we’re directed to live according to those things which are said to not be subject to investigation or otherwise are the sort of things we experience regardless of what we think about them. Sextus suggests this includes attending to appearances around us, our emotions, customs and laws, as well as passing on expertise like crafting and health care practices.
Are The Ten Modes reducible to a relativistic argument strategy?
Yes, but it’s complicated.
Sextus clarifies that nine of the modes can be understood as different expressions of the remaining one: the mode deriving from relativity. He also says, like every other point being reported on, the relativity mode can be turned against itself such that we’re left with little choice but to suspend judgment as to whether or not it is indeed the case.
He goes on to tell us the relativity mode is also one of the Five Modes and as such it acts as a kind of bridge functionally connecting the two sets.
Are the modes as presented by Sextus relevant in a contemporary context?
The short answer is no, at least not from my standpoint but that’ll take some explaining.
The Modes according to Sextus are arguably well stated for an ancient audience but the conditions we’re living under and the limits to what could be considered appearances have changed. Consider the invention of the microscope. Also, the modes have all been reformulated in one way or another over the intervening millennia so it makes sense to refer to more recent examples of similar argument strategies in order to take advantage of any improvements. They all work well as cues or prompts still, but as they appear in Outlines almost none of them are especially compelling anymore for me.
Do the doxastic concerns include any conception of belief whatsoever?
I’ve already gone into this to some degree through my answers to the last four questions. I’d like to be very clear though so I’ll restate and explain again. It should be noted that this is a matter which is subject to some interpretive variation because there are multiple valid readings according to the available primary texts. I’ll be limiting my comments to the perspective I most prefer here but I’d be happy to discuss others if there are any comments or questions.
Sextus explains that the skeptic way begins through investigation. The Pyrrhonist investigates philosophical insights and systems. What counts as a definition for these terms is seemingly obtained through what is said of such matters by those who claim related convictions. What I’ve just referred to as philosophical insight is what I understand Sextus to be referring to when he talks about his concerns with acquiring and maintaining belief.
It is painstakingly clarified that we’re not meant to investigate matters which are seemingly not subject to investigation in whatever respect. This is reported to be the sort of things we experience regardless of what we think about them as well as the sort of subject matter everyone unanimously assumes as being the case: these being points without disputation or dissent.
I take these as suitable examples: The experience of waking up, getting hungry, or needing the toilet. Also, acts like making food, getting from place to place… statements like “It appears that I feel tired at this moment” where there’s no firm conviction being conveyed but more like a loosely held observation about what seems to be a temporarily present feeling.
These are all the sort of thing Sextus seems to have in mind when it comes to what might be characterized as the sort of beliefs a Pyrrhonist is not concerned with.
— It is noteworthy that all of what I’ve explained above is covered in Book One of Pyrrhonist Outlines.
A Name And A Place 