In Defense of Skepticism

From a recent exchange with a friend:

erist —
Here’s an odd rant: criticisms for skepticism that supposes it’s self-defeating seem to depend on a categorical assumption about skepticism being within the domain of philosophical activity while simultaneously challenging the basis for and nature of philosophy.

I’m bringing it up because I think I’ve figured out a concise way to clarify a fair number of misunderstandings based on this sort of criticism. We can start by wondering whether it’s actually the case that skepticism is appropriately regarded as within the province of philosophy, because I’d say this is where the trouble begins. Unless all forms of inquiry count as philosophy, I assume skepticism is based on one or more forms of inquiry rather than being based on any particular philosophical activity or insight. There’s nothing especially circular about skeptics using the idea of inquiry in general and applying it to investigating philosophical matters from what I can tell.

The only way I can imagine someone arguing it’s circular from there is if skepticism is taken to undermine itself by assuming any sort of insight whatsoever counts as a philosophical insight… but this can be easily dealt with as a hasty objection by referring to any document typically held as a primary source of information on skepticism. Sextus straight up deals with this sort of concern within the first few sections of Pyrrhonist Outlines and it’s fairly clear reasoning too: skepticism isn’t concerned with obvious or clear insights of the sort that can be explained plainly without causing a disagreement, so there’s very likely no issue to be had ultimately.

Another way of characterizing this sort of complaint is by asking how skepticism makes sense when it reports to be using philosophical practices as a means for challenging philosophy itself. The answer, from my perspective, is that skepticism actually uses inquiry-based practices that can also be found in works of philosophy which is part of what leads people to suppose there’s a problem of some kind… but based on what I’ve said above, it’s probably a non-issue unless I’m missing something.

Stig —
If I recall correctly, even if the skeptic did concede to using philosophy to offer refutations of it, this isn’t a problem for the skeptic since the skeptic does not claim to uphold these tools in any way beyond their use for skeptical assessment.

erist —
Yeah, that’s another way of dealing with this sort of issue but people who’re combative over such things are going to continually object to this strategy because, to them, it sounds strange to wonder whether philosophy itself makes any sense by using philosophical practices in making our arguments because it seems to presuppose that philosophy makes sense and thus is at least somewhat self-contradictory.

The relevance of the concern, as I understand it, is to warn against naïve conceptions of skepticism: the sort of stance that leads a person to merely being naysayers or baseless contrarians. It’s hardly the sort of concern that presents a problem for skepticism in general tho, it’s legitimately a fairly weak point of contention but it’s nevertheless a widespread and popular complaint. I mainly get annoyed by angles like this when they’re used as a means for unilaterally dismissing or undermining skeptical approaches to philosophical activity.

My counter-concern is that imaginary nihilists and skeptics are common targets for idealized opponents, however they’re almost always presented as strawmen and just about never accompanied by a disclaimer indicating these characterizations carry nearly zero weight when it comes to contending with any actual literature from these traditions.